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Although the Chinese Government will be strongly tempted in
1997, and possibly before, to try to enforce a humiliating withdrawal
upon us, there are other factors which might sway them in favour of a
more reasonable settlement. By then the Chinese should be in the
United Nations. They will probably be keen to foster an impression
of moderation and responsibility, which would be damaged by an
attempt to impose impossible conditions upon us. Minor considera-
tions could be that a quarrel with us would also focus unwelcome
attention on Chinese inaction over the years since 1949, and upon
the obvious reluctance of Hong Kong Chinese to accept voluntarily
Communist rule. For these reasons the odds will not necessarily be
overwhelming against the Chinese agreeing to an orderly withdrawal
under tolerable conditions, or to some other solution of the kind
envisaged. In 1963 the Chinese themselves stated that, as far as
Hong Kong, Kowloon and Macao were concerned "we have always held
that, when conditions are ripe, (these issues) should be settled
peacefully through negotiations and that, pending a settlement, the
status quo should be maintained.'
9. In these circumstances the options mentioned in paragraph 4
are hereafter studied in detail:
Course 4(a) Do nothing
This appears to have nothing to commend it save in the
face of an utterly intractable Government in China, or if
China should fall into a state of anarchy. In the first
case we should have no option; in the second no one with
whom to discuss Hong Kong's future.
Course (b)
Prepare a voluntary and negotiated withdrawal as
soon as this could be arranged
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