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stand firm against, or better still ignore, any half-
hearted moves by the Chinese to alter it. If the Chinese
started to press really hard we would have to reconsider
in the light of what we believed the implications of the
pressure were.
16. I have asked the Political Adviser in Hong Kong to be
ready to advise me, on my arrival, whether there is some
small gesture I could make to Leung Wai-lam, the Head of
NCNA, which would be seen as a concession but would not
advance his position to an extent that would alarm the
Hong Kong establishment. Unfortunately, he has the reputa-
tion of being an implacable enemy of the Hong Kong
Government and I fear that little would be gained, and
much might be lost, by opening up a personal if unofficial
dialogue with him.
Confrontation prisoners
17. Chou En-lai has picked this out as the major item of
interest to him in Hong Kong at present. In view of the
numbers released since he spoke to Mr Denson for the time
being we can point to a generous response.
But it appears
from Sir Hugh Norman-Walker's letter of 13 September that
no further releases are likely in 1972 under present criteria
or procedures. My present inclination is not to accept
this, as failure to maintain momentum on this issue might
prejudice my entire governorship with Peking with all that
this would imply.
18. I realise the delicacy of this issue, particularly vis-
/a-vis
6.
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