TNAG-0281-FCO40-317-Visit-of-the-Chancellor-of-the-Duchy-of-Lancaster-to-Hong-Ko-1970 — Page 19

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20. The Chairman said that it had been stated that the likelihood of associate status for Hong Kong was small and that the CET would therefore be applied to Hong Kong products, although after a transitional period. He thought members would like to hear Mr. Rippon's views on the possible length of that period. Mr. Rippon thought that the CET would be adopted in full by the United Kingdom about 1975 or 1976.

21. Mr. Rippon said he would relate to his colleagues what he had seen and heard in Hong Kong. The Chairman thanked Members for discussing problems so frankly and hoped that it had also been a help to Mr. Rippon to hear their views.

22. At this point Mr. Rippon and Mr. Tickell left the meeting.

Minutes of the joint TIAB/TEXTAB meeting held on 6 August, 1970

23. The Chairman said that the minutes of the previous joint meeting had been confirmed by TEXTAB Members at a recent meeting. He wished to ask TIAB Members for their confirmation also. TIAB Members confirmed the minutes.

Britain and the European Economic Community : Part III : Position to be adopted by Hong Kong in relation to Britain's negotiations with the EEC regarding British membership of the Common Market (TIAB M/12/70; TEXTAB M/35/70)

24. Members agreed to the Chairman's suggestion that discussion of this memorandum be postponed as they had had insufficient time in which to study it.

Document No. 7

MEMORANDUM ON HONG KONG ATTITUDES

ATTITUDES

TOWARDS THE

BRITISH EEC CANDIDATURE BY Mr. C. C. C. TICKELL

Hong Kong officials and businessmen were virtually united in their views on the British EEC candidature. They put the following considerations:

(a) Hong Kong made a substantial contribution to the British balance of payments and had a favourable trade balance with Britain. It got very little in return;

(b) Any economic recession in the colony would upset the present precarious political and social balance from which Hong Kong might not recover. This would be gravely damaging to the West as a whole.

(c) Those responsible for the government of Hong Kong were the best judges of Hong Kong's interests, and should not be interfered with by Whitehall more than was absolutely essential.

(d) Even if the colony lost its present trading preferences in Britain, it should not suffer discrimination against its exports as a result of exclusion from the UNCTAD scheme for generalised preferences.

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