TNAG-0275-FCO40-311-Development-of-Kai-Tak-airport-at-Hong-Kong-1970 — Page 99

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occasionally make a real gesture towarde Hong Kong (such as responding

to the

which, as we see it, is not to turn us out of

Hong Kong, but, while destroying the confidence

of local people in us, to hold us there in

subservience to themselves as a provider which

needed foreign exchange. If we could give a

2

ive a

real measure of response to Hong-Kong's request over Kai Tak) it would go far to

far to reverse the

feelings which have grown up there towards

HMG and avert the political risks involved in

them.

G5.

There are other reasons why I could hope

we could be more sympathetic to Hong Kong's

request. We have, I suggest, every reason,

even in our present improved position, not

to encourage feelings of disillusionment and

chagrin on the part of one of the major

overseas holders of sterling. The growth of

such feelings, too, hardly helps our exporters

to the Hong Kong market,nor do they form the

best background against which to negotiate an

increased defence contribution from the Colony

towards the costs of our garrison there. ( We

are just about to embark on what are like ly

to be extremely difficult negotiations on

this point).

6.

But most of all in the context of

assistance to Kai Tak we are vulnerable in the

use we have made of the airfield in our own

civil aviation negotiations.

Yit

It was built with

the Hong Kong taxpayers money; we have used

our authority over Hong Kong to deny entry to

the airport to foreign airlines, whom the

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/Hong Kong