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showing that the bribe was connected with a public servant's duties is often incomplete, in that while it shows that the payment must have related to his official duties, it does not prove which particular duty, so that reliance has to be placed on inference.
8.
It is therefore unreasonable to oblige the prosecution to prove strictly the particular object of the bribe. Of course the accused is in the best position to say whether the reason attributed by the prosecution is the true one or not.
A similar situation is likely to arise in cases under clause 5.
9.
For these reasons the new clause 25 raises a rebuttable presumption that, in a prosecution under clause 4 or 5, the advantage, once proved to have been accepted, is presumed to have been accepted for the reason alleged in the charge. The clause is similar in its effect to section 2 of the Prevention of Corruption Act 1916. clause is limited to cases of "completed transactions" because it is in these cases that the problem of the "satisfied customer" is most likely to arise.
10.
Similar provisions to clause 25 are to be found in section 14 of Malaysia's Prevention of Corruption Act 1961 and section 8 of Singapore's Prevention of Corruption Ordinance 1960, although under these provisions (as also under section 2 of the English Prevention of Corruption Act 1916) the presumption raised is of such inducement or reward as is mentioned in the legislation, rather than in the particulars of the charge.
11.
Clause 14(4) and the new clause 20. Clause 14(4) is amended so that it will not be an offence for a suspected person to fail to comply with a notice under that clause. By the new clause 20, any statement or declaration made by a suspected person, in response to a notice under clause 14, and his failure to make such a statement or declaration, are admissible in evidence and may be made the subject of comment at his trial.
12.
Clause 14(1)(a) and (c). It is considered that, unless the power to obtain information is, potentially at least, comprehensive, it will be of little use. The only effective deterrent to corruption is the fear of detection. The profits of corruption are sometimes very large and the corrupter will take considerable trouble to conceal his gains. The commonest means of doing so is to use relatives, and friends to hold the proceeds (or property into which the proceeds have been converted) in their names, often for a share of the amount involved. In my opinion, there is a very strong case for conferring power to require information from those who may have helped the briber. The powers in clause 14(1)(a) and (c) should certainly act as a powerful deterrent. If they are restricted, they will be useless and leave to the corrupter a way of concealing his gains without much risk of their discovery.
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