TNAG-0254-FCO40-290-Contributions-of-Hong-Kong-for-costs-of-maintaining-military-1971 — Page 98

SECRET

reasons. the Nepalese Government would welcome an end to the

rundown of the Gurkha Brigade. He has also recommended that, while we should inform the Nepalese as soon as possible about

any decision on the Gurkhas, we should not consult them.

The Hong Kong Garrison

7.

Ministers of the previous government decided in 1968' that

the Hong Kong army garrison should be increased by one Battalion

to 73 major army units at the end of 1971. This increase

stemmed from their decision to withdraw British forces from thùir

stations in Malaysia/Singapore by the end of 1971; thereafter

F

a quick reinforcement of Hong Kong would no longer have been

possible.

8. It is possible that Treasury Ministers may urge at the DOPC meeting that the levels of the Hong Kong garrison (our

largest single commitment outside Europe in the 1970s) should

be re-examined. It is difficult to dissent from this suggestion,

but the Secretary of State may wish to point out that Hong Kong

is faced not merely with an external threat from China but also

with a Chinese-inspired internal security threat of serious

dimonsions.

1.

}

Moreover even if Ministers decide to retain a

ground force element (possibly a battalion) as part of a British

military presence in Malaysia and Singapore after the end of

1971, it is uncertain whether we shall be able to draw on it

for reinforcement of Hong Kong.

! DEFENCE DEPARTMENT

RO JULY 1970