TNAG-0252-FCO40-288-Strength-of-Hong-Kong-garrison-1970 — Page 16

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SECRET UK EYES ONLY

ANNEX A TO

DOP 535/70 (Draft) (Continued

5. CINCFE has also commented on 2 political aspects connected with

accelerating the rundown. The first relates to advancing the

rundown of some 400 of the 12,000 LEC, but he anticipates no great

difficulty over this point. The second refers to the timing of consultations with the Singapore and Malaysian Governments about the

possibility of accelerating the rundown. He considers that they must

be informed by Jan 71, at the latest, if units are to start

withdrawing in Apr 71.

OUR VIEWS

6.

We agree in principle with CINCFE's recommendation that the

rundown of the Far East land forces should be accelerated for the

reasons he has stated. In addition, the earlier withdrawal of

some units, personnel and families would ease the movement problem

at a peak period in Aug 71. However, there are a number of

We discuss problems in implementing CINCFE's proposals in full.

these below, give a compromise solution, and finally comment on

certain political aspects. We have made the following assumptions:

The continued military presence in SE Asia will not

B..

differ significantly from that recommended in a previous

study (6).

b. A covering force as planned (7) will be required for

the Gulf withdrawal which is due to be completed by 31 Dec 71.

Incoming Land Force

7.

CINCFE has proposed that the incoming land force should replace

the outgoing land force without a gap in Aug/Sep 71. However, the infantry battalion nominated as the land element of the continued UK

Notes:

6.

7.

COS 67/70

5021/1/CBFG dated 30 June 1970

SECRET AUK EYES ONLY