TNAG-0252-FCO40-288-Strength-of-Hong-Kong-garrison-1970 — Page 143

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DOP Note 706/70

Draft Continued)

administrative reasons and reasons of morale it would

be militarily undesirable for 1 D and D to remain in

Northern Ireland beyond 10 September 1970. Unless,

therefore, arrangements could be made to relieve 1 D

and D with a unit from UK by this date it would be

necessary for the garrison in Northern Ireland to be

reduced by one major unit in the infantry role.

d. In the short term no military advantage would be

gained by withdrawing the one company group from

Gibraltar to rejoin its parent battalion for service

in Northern Ireland. Furthermore both political and

military considerations make its withdrawal undesirable

at present.

3. It would be militarily acceptable, subject to

Ministerial approval, to withdraw one battalion from

the Gulf. However, this unit could not be used in

Northern Ireland in the short term, although, in the

event, the unit due to relieve it would be available

for deployment to Northern Ireland in January 1971, thus reducing the number of units to be withdrawn from BAOR. f. By accepting a temporary reduction in our

commitments for protective security in Singapore,

42 Cdo RM could be made available for service in

Northern Ireland from mid-September to mid-December

1970.

RECOMMENDATIONS

40.

It is recommended that:

a.

1 D and D should be returned to Malta by 10

September 1970.

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