with fellow members of EEC. Under (i) and (ii) above therefore
Hong Kong's interest cannot be defended so effectively in the GATT
as before entry to EEC.
10.
As a
The attractions of course (iii) above are clear.
separate contracting party to the GATT, Hong Kong would continue to
have GATT rights vis-a-vis members of the enlarged community,
including Britain. Hong Kong would be separately represented in
all GATT bodies, and there would be no need to iron out differences
of view and approach hitherto required by a UK spokesman
representing Hong Kong. There would be further advantage both
domestically and externally if a declaration were made that Hong
Kong had acquired full autonomy in the conduct of its external
commercial relations. However, it has hitherto been the view of
both Hong Kong and the FCO that such a move would antagonise
the Chinese Peoples Republic, who might see this as a stepping-
stone to full independence of the Colony. It is now thought that
Hong Kong is not now so worried about this possibility as they
were in 1967.
LINE TO TAKE
11.
If these questions are raised by the Hong Kong Delegation,
we can only agree with any Hong Kong analysis that leads them to
suppose that their formal GATT rights will be diminished after
our entry to EEC, if Hong Kong's GATT status is not changed.
But loss of GATT rights is not Hong Kong's real problem: that is
rather the requirement upon Britain to harmonise its practices
with EEC. Accordingly Hong Kong's safeguard much come from our
work in their interests within the EEC, rather than from the
7.
No comments yet.
Private notes are available after approval.