TNAG-0244-FCO40-280-Exports-of-textiles-from-Hong-Kong-to-USA-1970 — Page 85

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expressed the view that in fact the pressure for restraint

on textiles was, political rather than economic. He

emphasised the prime importance of trade for Hong Kong

and the political repercussions in and for Hong Kong if

that trade was damaged in any way. Mr. Nehmer assured

Sir Eugene that the U.S. Government was well aware of

the political inplications for Hong Kong and reiterated

that the U.S. Government was not talking of rolling back

from 1968 performance, or of creating unemployment in

Hong Kong; it was talking of a moderation in the rate

of growth; although he could not accept that a growth

rate which had fallen to 27% could be considered

sufficient moderation. Whilst the Administration

understood the political problems for Hong Kong it

was a fact that the Labour Unions in the United States

did not. They were particularly prejudiced against

Hong Kong and still spoke of it as a great big sweatshop.

The Administration had tried to hold down Union pressures

as far as possible and to be as little influenced by

those pressures as possible. But they could not be

discounted altogether.

13.

Mr. Nehmer went on that throughout the

discussion so far the U.K. and H.K. Government representa-

tives had seemed to be working from a basic proposition

that the man made fibre and wool problems were some

/how

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