TNAG-0244-FCO40-280-Exports-of-textiles-from-Hong-Kong-to-USA-1970 — Page 24

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

(1) Ifo

(II) It followed from the Prime Minister's

letter, that we could see no possibility of accepting the point at 4(B) above, i.e., the possibility of establishing overall ceilings for non-cotton textile exports to the USA from individual supplying countries. however, the US administration were prepared to lower their sights to the extent of making it clear that their preoccupations would be met if they could secure restraints on a limited range of specific items such as shirts and sweaters where a presentable injury case can be made out, we should be very glad to pursue with Tresize the question how the US might proceed and how the matter could be handled internationally so as to minimise the possible damaging repercussions of which we were all conscious.

6.

Could

R

:) What we had in mind was to discuss the

possibility of an arrangement involving at any rate the main exporting countries. and not Hong Kong in particular, but we could not discuss with him, even on a noncommital basis, any specific

arrangement relating to Hong Kong in the absence of a representative of the

Hong Kong Government.

) We did not want to find American pressure

diverted away from the Japanese and towards us either directly or through Hong Kong.

Ridley saw Trezise again on 16 March and spoke as instructed He made it clear that

(v) any discussion with Tresize must be within

the limits of injury-linked measures. He also emphasised that we would be discussing an arrangement involving the main exporting countries generally, and that any discussion of an arrangement relating specifically to Hong Kong could only take place with Hong Kong participation. Tregise seemed to accept all this, but remained very interested in the

/ possibility...

on lines of para. 5°(1) 6(iv)

above.