TNAG-0239-FCO40-275-Entitlement-of-Hong-Kong-to-generalised-tariffs-preferences--1970 — Page 88

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Wh Christofas

11'.

Andel'son

Mr. Marshall

Mr. Denman

Mr. Robinson

Confidential

UNCTAD Preferences: Hong Kong___

H.K.D.

K. 271 256

When I went to see Tran in DG I of the Commission on 29 September, I met up with Di Martino, the

Commission's chief negotiator on UNCTAD preferences; we had a long wrangle over the question of Hong Kong.

2. Di Martino took the line again and again that we should not press now for a substantive answer from the Community to our aide-memoire on the inclusion of Hong Kong in the UNCTAD preference scheme. If we did so, we would merely provoke a negative reply. The member states were less willing than ever to see Hong Kong included (even the Germans were now worried because of their problems over umbrellas) and would not even envisage the minimalist solution which he had once discussed with British and Hong Kong officials and which we had treated as derisory. If we pushed in Brussels we would get a no in the O.E.C.D. in Paris.

3. The advice repetitively proferred by Di Martino was that we should allow things to develop slowly and make the best of the Community approach of examining beneficiaries other than the 77 on a case by case basis. We should encourage the Six to give a temporing reply to our aide-memoire. But he could offer no better encouragemento in support of this than "something may turn up" arguments.

t. Di Martino purported to discount our argument about the need for the EEC to include Hong Kong so as to increase pressure on the Americans and the Japanese to do likewise. The Japanese would never include Hong Kong. And the Americans would not be the slightest bit impressed by the sort of minimalist offer which was the Lost that could ever be extracted from the Community

member states.

5. Di Martino was his usual confused and confusing self. And he is clearly nettled by the amount of attention he is having to give to Hong Kong as a result of our diplomatic initiatives in Brussels and the OECD. But Tran, who has a much cooler head, is more helpfuls and was at one time not too pessimistic about getting something for Hong Kong in the UNCTAD preferences field, was just as firm on the point that the harder and more urgently we pushed now the more likely we were to provoke a decision to exclude Hong Kong.

!

G.R. Denman, Esq., CMG, (3.0.T.) J.A. Robinson, Esq., CI.G (F.C.O. P.E. Hall, Esq., (E.I.D. F.C.O.

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Manmay

(D.H.A. Hannay)

30 September, 1970.

CONFIDENTIAL

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