TNAG-0239-FCO40-275-Entitlement-of-Hong-Kong-to-generalised-tariffs-preferences--1970 — Page 26

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consultations between the parties lirectly concerned with a view to finding solutions before the schemes go into effect.

(2) Rules of Origin

Here the work has not been finished and it looks as though the chances of a common, or harmonised, origin system being adopted is pretty slim. The Working Group on Rules of Origin will meet again later this year to try and reach as much agreement as possible on common elements and its final report will be remitted direct to governments. It therefore looks

as though in this case also each donor country will, in practice, go its own way.

(3) Beneficiaries

This is, of course, another vital question that is no nearer settlement on an agreed basis. In the course of the Session, the "77" let it be known that they would be content with an assurance from the donor countries that no member of the Group of 77 would be excluded by any donor country. Apart from that they were content to let the donor countries decide the other beneficiaries. However, the donor countries were not willing to give this assurance to the 77 and in the end the section on Beneficiaries contained no more than

(a) a reiteration of the joint position of the OECD countries as set out in their original submission of November, 1969, and

(b) a series of claims to beneficiary status which were

"noted" by the Committee.

These claims included one on behalf of all the "77" and one by the U.K. for all its dependent territories (a list of which was provided). What this means is that the donor countries how have virtually a free hand to make their own decisions on beneficiaries. The question that remains is whether they will now pluck up the courage to have a proper consultation in the OECD on this issue or whether, when the crunch comes, each donor will be left to decide for itself what to do.

Trade and Development Board

16.

When the Board met on 12 and 13 October to consider the Report most of its discussion was concentrated on the question of institutional machinery, the outcome of which is described above. The Board, however, also formally adopted the Report of the Special Committee on Preferences and approved the institutional arrangements proposed in Section VIII of the agreed Conclusions. The Board also transmitted to the General Assembly the following text to be inserted into the strategy document for the Second U.N. Development Decade: -

"Arrangements concerning the establishment of generalised, non-discriminatory, non-reciprocal preferential treatment to exports of developing countries in the markets of developed countries have been drawn up and considered mutually acceptable to developed and developing countries in UNCTAD. Preference- giving countries are determined to seek as rapidly as possible the necessary legislative or other sanction with the aim of implementing the preferential arrangements as early as possible in 1971. Efforts for further improvements of these preferential arrangements will be pursued in a dynamic context in the light of the objectives of Resolution 21 of the Second Conference of UNCTAD."

/Conclusion

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