206
CYPHER/CAT A
JORITY HONG KONG
VEL:10 585
CONFIDENTIAL
[HEUTRAL]
MIRK6/12
ÇONFIDENTIAL
TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
3 SEPTEMBER 1970
pa.
ADDRESSED PRIORITY FCO TELNO 585 OF 3 SEPTEMBER RFI WASHINGTON
UKDEL E E C BRUSSELS (FOR DODGE) UKMIS GENEVA (FOR JONES) TOKYO
AND H K GOVT OFFICE LONDON
YOUR TELNO 567
PREFERENCES
: 3
➢་་
201 208
IT WAS NOT THE INTENTION TO SUGGEST THAT THE LINE PROPOSED
(189) IN PARA 4 OF MY .TELNO 537 SHOULD BE USED AS A THREAT SO MUCH AS A
REINFORCEMENT OF THE OTHER ARGUMENTS PUT FORWARD IN PARAS 1-3
OF THAT TELEGRAM, IT SEEMED THAT, IF YOU AGREED WITH THE
ARGUMENTS PUT FORWARD, IT WOULD BE REASONABLE TO MAKE IT CLEAR
TO THE OTHER PRINCIPAL DONORS' THAT, IF THEY CHOSE TO EXCLUDE
HONG KONG (PARTICULARLY, IF THEY DID SO ON GROUNDS OF ITS STATUS
AS A DEPENDENT AND OF THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE METROPOLITAN
POWER - TERRITORY), YOU COULD NO LONGER ADHERE TO SELF-ELECTION
į.
AND WOULD HAVE TO RECONSIDER THE U.K. OFFER. THIS COULD INDEED
LEAD TO SOME UNRAVELLING OF THE PRESENT POSITION,
"
WHICH, AT THIS LATE STAGE-WITH THE U.N.C.T.A.D. COMMITTEE DUE
TO MEET ON 21ST SEPTEMBER-WOULD NO DOUBT BE POLITICALLY
UNDESIRABLE TO ALL CONCERNED. BUT WOULD NOT THIS UNDESIRABILITY
GIVE THE ARGUMENT SOME DEGREE OF STRENGTH IN NEGOTIATION?
2. WASHINGTON AND UKDEL ARE BEST PLACED TO ASSESS THE LIKELY
EFFECT ON THE U.S. AND THE E.E.C. OF A SPECIFIC INDICATION
ABOUT KOREA AND TAIWAN, AND WE CANNOT OURSELVES ASSESS THE
EXTENT TO WHICH EXCLUDING THEM WOULD BE QUANTITATIVELY
CONTI SENT
TRATAT NEJAU
/ALTROPRIATE
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