TNAG-0239-FCO40-275-Entitlement-of-Hong-Kong-to-generalised-tariffs-preferences--1970 — Page 18

CYPHER CAT A

CONFIDENTIAL

IMMEDIATE GOVERNOR HONG KONG

TO F.C.O. LONDON

TELEGRAM NUMBER 738

23 OCTOBER 1970

CONFIDENTIAL 230432Z

FRAME

284

ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE LONDON TELEGRAM

NUMBER 738 OF 23 OCTOBER 1970 AND REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO

UKDEL BRUSSELS, AMBASSADOR BRUSSELS (FOR DODGE) AND UKMIS GENEVA (FOR JONES).

/AICK 6/6 101)

YOUR TELEGRAM NUMBER 69%: HONG KONG/EEC,

ARE 1/102) IN MY FLASH TELEGRAM 712 WE WERE UNABLE TO SET OUT FULLY

285

OUR VIEWS ABOUT THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN NEGOTIATIONS ON GENERALISED

PREFERENCES AND ENLARGEMENT'' NEGOTIATIONS AND, IN PARTICULAR, THE DESIRABILITY, AS WE SEE IT, OF KEEPING THEN AS SEPARATE AS POSSIBLE.

S. IN THE FIRST PLACE, THE ARGUMENT ABOUT GENERALISED PREFERENCES

IS ONE INVOLVING NOT ONLY THE E.E.C. BUT ALSO JAPAN AND THE

U.S.A. AND THEREFORE INVOLVES GREATER DANGERS FOR US THAN THE

POSSIBLE LOSS OF PREFERENCES (WHETHER COMMONWEALTH OR GENERALISED) IN BRITAIN ALONE. WE THINK IT DESIRABLE THAT THE DIPLOMATIC OFFENSIVE TO BRING ALL THREE ''DONORS'' INTO LINE SHOULD BE, AS FAR AS POSSIBLE, A CONCERTED ONE. THE IMMEDIATE DANGER WE

HAVE BEEN TRYING TO AVERT IS THAT ONE OF THESE WILL ANNOUNCE

THE EXCLUSION OF HONG KONG FROM THEIR OFFER THUS TRIGGERING

CFF A SIMILAR DECISION BY THE OTHERS. ONLY IF IT WERE CONCEIVABLE

THAT A FAVOURABLE

DECISION WOULD BE REACHED IN ENLARGEMENT NEGOTIATIONS EARLY

ENOUGH TO INFLUENCE U.S. AND JAPAN DECISIONS, WOULD WE SEE

MERIT IN LINKING THE NECOTIATIONS IN THE E.E.C. NOW.

3. SECONDLY, FOR A NUMBER OF REASONS WE ARE RELUCTANT TO SEE

THE QUESTION OF GENERALISED PREFERENCES BECOME PART OF THE

ENLARGEMENT EXERCISE, AT LEAST AT THIS STAGE. WHILE IT IS TRUE THAT REFUSAL OF ASSOCIATED STATUS WOULD AGGRAVATE, OR RATHER FAIL TO PALLIATE, EXCLUSION FROM GENERALISED PREFERENCES,

AND INCLUSION BY U.K. ALONG WITH EXCLUSION BY THE E.E.C.

CAUSE PROBLEMS OF ASSIMILATION OF PREFERENCES IN THE CONTEXT

OF BRITAIN'S ENTRY NEGOTIATIONS, WE CONTINUE TO BE GENERALLY

OF THE VIEW THAT IT IS BETTER NOT TO PRESS THE E.E.0. FUR

POSITIVE CONCESSIONS TO HONG KONG IN THE CONTEXT OF BRITAIN'S

ENTRY, IN CASE IT SHOULD PROVOKE A DEMAND FOR, OR THE IMPOSITION

(F NEGATIVE RESTRICTIONS.

WOULDH11116/12

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CONFIDENTIAL

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