TNAG-0229-FCO40-265-Long-term-study-of-future-of-Hong-Kong-1970 — Page 73

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Move over any sigh of

weatening moolve on our part wou'd leade to increasing Chaine

Were we to attempt to discuss it with

the present Chinese regime we could only

expect hostility (even malevolence) and

a desire on their part to pay off old scores.

The Colony will remain, as the Chinese

themselves have put it, the crux of Sino-

British relations. Our presence there,

despite the advantages the derive, must be

an irritant to them. Byt efforts on our

premna mily

part to extricate ourselves might well turn

a

out to be/greater irritant. For the

present, I am sure that we must continue

to show firmly that we intend to maintain

our position, giving no indication whatsoever

that we might, In certain circumstances

contemplate prémature withdrawal.

Confidence within Hong Kong is fragile and

would not survive the knowledge that we

avere consistering

raised w the Chinese the question

of possible terms of withdrawal. It would

be no gain if, in an effort to mitigate Re

our long-term difficulties in theColony,

we were to precipitate an immediate

catastrophe controversy.

5. The emergence of a more pragmatic

regime in China would, of course, introduce

a new dimension. If such a regime were to

emerge there would bemuch to be said

for attempting to negotiate the return of

HongKong on the best terms available for its

people, or perhaps even for exploring the

terms on which the Chinese might envisage

an extension of our tenure. But as I

indicated above, there is, as yet, no

solid ground for believing that such a

regime would be more accommodating.

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