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5.
The emergence of a more pragmatic regime in China would, of course, introduce a new dimension. If such a regime were to emerge there would be much to be said for attempting to negotiate the return of Hong Kong on the best terms available for its people, or perhaps even for exploring the terms on which the Chinese might envisage an extension of our tenure. But as I indicated above, there is, as yet, no solid ground for believing that such a regime would be more accommodating. Moreover, the whole matter is so hypothetical and subject to so many imponderables, that it is doubtful if anything is to be gained by attempting now a detailed assessment of the possibilities.
6. To sum up, the general conclusions which I should like my colleagues to endorse are these:
(a)
There is no prospect off our reaching agreement about the future of Hong Kong with the present Chinese Government.
(b) Any unilateral attempt on our part now to work towards
some new status for Hong Kong would lead to an immediate loss of confidence within the Colony and could quickly
be disastrous.
(c)
If a more pragmatic government were to emerge in China we should consider the possibility of negotiating with them new arrangements for Hong Kong. But it would be premature to attempt now a detailed assessment of the possibilities.
(a) For the present, in administering the Colony, we must
assume, and be seen to assume, that we shall be there at any rate until 1997.
This may seem a somewhat Micawberish policy. As I acknowledged at the outset, disaster could befall us at any time with very little notice. But short of some radical transformation of the situation, e.g. an all-out effort by the Chinese to make our position intolerable or an expressed determination by them to take over the Colony in the fairly near future, the approach I have outlined might see us through at any rate the next five to ten years which is perhaps as far ahead as it is prudent to look in dealing with Hong Kong.
7. The conclusions above are broadly in line with the conclusions and recommendations of the report K(69)1.
Accordingly,
I propose that the Committee, if it shares my views, should give
and general endorsement to the recommendati ons of K(69)1;
taking up the particular recommendation that future policy with regard to Hong Kong be reviewed at regular intervals in consultation with the Governor, should direct officials to undertake a further review in the course of this year in time to submit a revised report to the Committee in the first half of
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