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or reservations as the Ministerial Committee on Hong Kong sees fit
to make. However, in view of the proposal to present a revised report next year (paragraph 8 above), by which time also the recommended studies (paragraph 7 above) should be complete, it may
be considered more appropriate to defer reference to DOPC.
Background
13. For the most part the paper itself contains a great deal of the background required for a proper appreciation of its arguments and
conclusions. The speaking notes do, however, introduce
(in paragraph 5) a matter that is not discussed in the paper namely, the suggestion that UK actions and policy affecting Hong Kong must take into account the paramount need to sustain public confidence in the Colony. Some background to this is
provided below.
14. For some years now there has been a growing feeling in Hong Kong that Britain regards the Colony as a nuisance and an impediment. We left Hong Kong to grapple alone (without significant financial assistance) in the post-war years with the
tremendous problems posed by the influx of refugees from China. At the same time we are seen as having dealt the Colony a series of
blows to its trade and finances: the restrictions on its exports
of cotton textiles to this country since 1959, the import surcharge (1964), the "carry-over" (of textile quotas) controversy (1965), the increase in the defence contribution (1966), devaluation (1967), the import deposit scheme (1968) and the decision to impose a tariff on cotton textile imports from the Commonwealth (1969).
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Private notes are available after approval.