~6-
the People's Republic benefitted from the remittances received from the Chinese either in, or via, Hong-Kong and from the profits of her commercial undertakings in the Colony. Moreover, if Peking was to take over the Colony she "would still have to supply its citizens with food on a large scale and would get little of external value in return with which to maintain her foreign
7 purchases of grain and machinery".
Although Mao has consistently urged his followers to put political considerations before economic ones, it appears as if the latter underlay
Peking's cautious attitude to Hong-Kong throughout the crisis. When it was clear that the Colony's authorities were not going to give way in face of the Chinese pressure, retreat was felt to be the only realistic course. Terrorism seemed to have been part of this retreat, as seen in the burning down of the British Embassy in Peking in late August 1967, ostensibly in order to obtain the release of Communist journalists imprisoned in Hong-Kong after the riots. "The Embassy attack was clearly a surrogate for tougher action where it would
8 really count in Hong-Kong itself". It acted as a safety valve for Chinese
xenophobia against Hong-Kong.
By the end of the year conditions within the Colony had reverted to normal. Tensions at a lower level remained, but these were an accepted fact of life.
Throughout the crisis China's deeds had never matched her words.
7. A.S.B. Olver, Ibid, p224.
8. The Economist, 29th August 1967, p705.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Articles & Journals
olver, A.S.E.,
"China and Hong-Kong".
The World Today. June 1967.
The Far Eastern Economic Review.
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