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(c) The fact that all three members of the M.F.A. with whom I
did business were known to me in the past not only helped
to make the talks agreeable, but shows the staying power
through the Cultural Revolution of many of its best operatives.
(d) For the first time in my experience the Chinese showed some
willingness to discuss issues of general importance and
encouraged me to pursue such matters with the Chargé in
London whom "they were sure would respond".
(e) Neither the Chinese nor the Russians scem likely to lose
patience in their talks or to break them off because of the
patent lack of progress.
A move of the site to Moscow or of
a replacement of Mr. Kuznetzov is not to be excluded.
Reports of even partial agreement in a limited withdrawal of
Soviet troops were flatly denied by the Soviet Embassy,
(f) On the subject of a Geneva Conference and on the situation
in Lao I extracted nothing new in respect of the Chinese
position.
(g) The level of Chinese representation at the Lenin celebrations
in the Soviet Embassy, which I attended, was a positive insult,
The senior person present was the junior of the two who dined
with us the previous evening.
(h) Peking, despite the digging of air raid shelters and the
consequent piles of spoil on the roads, did not give the
impression of a capital in the grip of war fever.
It was
not significantly different from early 1966, apart from new
construction (and destruction of the city wall).
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