TNAG-0214-FCO40-250-Proposals-for-appointment-of-a-ombudsman-in-Hong-Kong-1968 — Page 105

Extract from Report of the Fiji Constituttional Conference 1970

SUC.I

party, whose appointment would be most acceptable to the leaders in the House of the Opposition parties. The Governor-General would have the power, exerciseable in his own deliberate judgment/to revoke the appointment of the Leader of the/Opposition if he considered that he had ceased to fulfil the qualifications for appointment.

Police

54. The Constitution would place the police force under the command of the Commissioner of Police and provide that, in the exercise of his power to determine the use and control the operations of the police force, the Commissioner would be under an obligation to comply with general directions of policy with respect to the maintenance of public safety and public order given to him by the responsible Ministers; in the exercise of his.comand of the force in other respects the Commissione would act on his own responsibility and be independent. The organisation, maintenance and adminstration of the police force would be the responsibility of the Minister. The Commissioner of Police and Deputy Commissioner would be appointed by the Police Service Commission after consultation with the Prime Minister. acting appointment would be made in the same way.

Director of Public Prosecutions

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55. The Constitution would provide for the appoint- ment of a Director of Public Prosecutions who would have independent powers in relation to criminal. prosecutions corresponding to those vested in the Attorney-General by the existing Constitution of Fiji. The Director/would be appointed by the Judicial and Legal Services Commission. A person would not be qualifed to be or to act as Director unless he were qualified for appointment as a judge of the Supreme Court. The Director would vacate office on attaining the age of 60. The provisions relating to removal of the Director of Public Prosecutions would be the same as for the Auditor-General except that the procedure would be initiated and the members of the investigating tribunal would be appointed by the Judicial and Legal Services Commission.

Prerogative of Mercy

56. The Constitution would provide for the Governor- General to exercise the Prerogative of Mercy in Her Majesty's name and on Her behalf. It would also provide for the appointment by the Governor-General in his own deliberate judgment of a Commission consisting of a Chairman and not less than two other members to advise him upon the exercise of the Prerogative of Mercy; and he would be required to agt in accordance with their advice.

The Ombudsman

57. The Constitution would establish the office of Ombudsman and provide for the making of appoint- ments to this office by the Governor-General, after consulatation with the Prime Minister, the Leader of the Opposition, and such other persons as appeared

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to him in his own deliberate judgment to be leaders of parties in the House of Representatives. The Ombudsman would hold office for a period of four years and would be removeable only on grounds of inability or misbehaviour after a tribunal consisting of persons who held or had held high judicial office in some part of the Commonwealth, had investigated any allegation against him and have recommended his removal; the procedure for removal of the Ombuds- man would be initiated by the Governor-General in his own deliberate judgment. No person would be qualified for appointment as Ombudsman if he were a member of, or a candidate for election to, Parliament or any local authority, or were a local Government officer. No person holding the office of Ombudsman would be permitted to perform the functions of any public office or, without the approval of the Prime Minister in each particular case, to hold any other office of emolument or engage in any occupation for reward outside the duties of his office.

58. The Ombudsman would have jurisdiction to investigate complaints regarding the acts, omissions, decisions and recommendations of specified public bodies and officers which affect the interests of indivi-

duals or bodies of persons. He would be entitled to act upon his own initiative or upon receiving a complaint from an individual or a body (other than a governmental or local government authority), and Ministers and members of the two Houses would also be able to refer matters to him for consideration. The bodies and officers whose actions the Ombudsman would be authorised to investigate would include Government Departments, their officers, tender boards, the police, the prison service and other services, maintained or controlled by the Government; and such other officers or authorities as may be prescribed by Parliament. The personal acts and decisions of Ministers, acts of the Director of Public Prosecutions and persons acting under his instructions; decisions of the Service Commissions, and decisions of the authorities relating to appointments, promotions, discipline, removal, pensions benefits and similar matters affecting public officers, would be excluded from investigation by the Ombudsman.

59. The Constitution would contain provisions enabling the Ombudsman to examine witnesses and also provisions to prevent the disclosure of information on the grounds that it prejudiced defence, external relations or internal security or that it might divulge the proceedings of the Cabinet. The Ombudsman would be entitled to refuse to investigate any complaint on the ground that it was more than 12 months old or that it was vexatious or too trivial or that the complainant was insufficiently interested in the matter, and he would be enabled to discontinue an investigation for any reason that seemed fit to him. He would be precluded from investigating any matter in respect of which the aggrieved person had a remedy in a court of law or right of appeal to or review by a tribunal, unless the Ombudsman were satisfied that in. the particular circumstances it was not reasonable to expect that person to avail himself of that remedy or right. He would not be precluded from investigating a matter merely because it was open to the complainant to apply to the Supreme Court alleging a violation of fundamental rights.

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