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have consistently sought to avoid a conflict with a major power which might result in retaliation against China, especially involving the use of nuclear weapons. Chinese military strategy is essentially defensive and the Chinese Army is deployed and equipped to fight a lo defensive land campaign relying on guerrilla warfare and exploiting China's vast terrain and enormous population. At the same time the Chinese have not neglected nuclear and missile development. It has been estimated that the Chinese could have 80-100 medium range ballistic missiles by the mid-1970's and a force of 10-15 inter-Continental ballistic missile launchers by 1975, The launching of a Chinese satellite on 24 April bears out this estimate, and it seems clear that while the Cultural Revolution may have delayed the Chinese nuclear and missile programmes, they have not been significantly damaged. Given the present restoration of order and return to more orthodox economic policies inside the country, together with the personal sanction extended to nuclear and missile development by Mao, it seems reasonable to conclude that these programmes will now go ahead largely without interference. The possession of nuclear weapons does not mean that the Chinese will be tempted to adopt a more adventurist foreign policy. For a long time to come they will still be the weakest link in the China-Soviet Union-United States triangle. Moreover, they calculate that time is on their side. In the eyes of the Chinese, however, nuclear weapons may render China less susceptible to pressure from her major rivals, increase her prestige among uncommitted countries and boost her efforts to secure a major role in international affairs.
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Infpreeyan
(L. V. Appleyard) 19 June, 1970
CONFIDENTIAL
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