TNAG-0186-FCO40-222-Special-branch-reports-on-Communist-activities-1969 — Page 177

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further attempts to attract more students including the establishment of

new schools and Branches. The emphasis placed on this sphere in the

Peking directive speaks for itself, and gives some cause for concern.

25.

While the Peking directive is followed there is unlikely to be

any resumption of violent communist activity in the Colony. However,

spontaneous incidents can still occur and could lead to some violent

reaction from local communist supporters. It is unlikely, but not

impossible, that a situation could be reached where once again local

communist leaders, and perhaps Peking, might be forced to support a more

violent opposition to the Hong Kong Government. As always, events in

China will dictate the nature and extent of communist activities within

the Colony and any major upheaval in Peking could well cause an abrupt

change of communist policy in Hong Kong.

26.

The tactics outlined in paragraphs 21 to 24, although containing

little that is new, will continue to present a long term and insidious

threat to the Government.

Conclusions

27.

Following the initiation of a policy of non-violent struggle, the

communists' efforts to widen their base of support among the population of

the Colony, since the beginning of 1968, have been largely unsuccessful and

morale within their own ranks has remained low. Only in the field of

education have they made any real progress. The most recent directive from

Peking indicates clearly that the communists in Hong Kong must continue to

confine themselves to a political campaign which will not interfere with the

progress of Sino-British relations. The drive to win the support of the

/population

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