TNAG-0179-FCO40-215-Strength-of-Hong-Kong-Garrison-1970 — Page 80

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Annex A to Note No. 6

VISIT OF DEPUTY UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE

(SIR LESLIE MONSON)

TO HONG KONG, OCTOBER. 1969

DEFENCE MATTERS

BACKGROUND

General

Hong Kong could not be defended against a determined Chinese attack except perhaps by the use of nuclear weapons. There are no plans for the reinforcement of Hong Kong against external aggression and the external role of the garrison is to offer such resistance as may be appropriate in the circum- stances at the time. Although there is no agreement with the United States about coming to the defence of Hong Kong, the

U.S. Government have been given an assurance that it is our

intention to resist aggression. Local opinion, while probably

under no illusion about the ability of the present garrison to

resist for long, regards the existence of British troops deployed to guard the frontier as an assurance of our intention

to maintain our position in the Colony.

2. An overt attack by the Chinese is less likely than an

attempt to get the Colony by subversion. Our ability to

preserve law and order depends essentially on maintaining the

confidence of the Chinese population in the British intention

to stay. The majority are politically inarticulate. Their

wish is to trade and survive. They do not wish, however, to

be on the losing side and once their confidence started to

slip the process would be cumulative and there would be an

increasing tendency to transfer allegiance to Peking.

Garrison

3. At the end of 1966 British military forces in the Colony were 6 major Army units, four fighter aircraft and three

coastal minesweepers: these units comprised a total strength of approximately 9,000 uniformed personnel.

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