TNAG-0179-FCO40-215-Strength-of-Hong-Kong-Garrison-1970 — Page 47

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would almost certainly lead to the abandonment of the whole

project. The Governor would also see serious difficulties in mecting the recurrent costs of the scheme if this were to involve any increase in Hong Kong's defence contribution during the currency of the existing agreement between the Hong Kong Government and Her Majesty's Government, which

expires in 1971.

4.

The Defence Secretary visited Hong Kong in June 1969 and discussed the matter with the Governor. In the course of

these discussions the Governor made it clear that he was

quite unwilling to contemplate any capital payment by Hong Kong for purchasing the aircraft; and so far as operating costs were concerned, he emphasised the difficulties with which he would be faced in asking his Executive Council for any

additional defence contribution before 1971. The Defence Secretary then mentioned that R.A.F. aircraft would be visiting Singapore for training purposes for limited periods each year after 1971 and that he would enquire as to the possibility of occasional visits to Hong Kong forming part of these training detachments. The Governor indicated that he might, in the last resort, be content to accept such visits as a substitute for the establishment of a permanent fighter unit in the

Colony.

5. As a result of the above discussions we addressed a letter to the Governor at the end of August (copy attached at Annex A) setting out the extent to which visits could be made to Hong Kong by R.A.F. aircraft in conjunction with the post- 1971 training programme already planned for the Far East. The letter also gave details of the types of aircraft which would be involved together with provisional estimates of the

operating costs and the capital cost of certain special

facilities which would be required for the aircraft at Kai Tak, (which Hong Kong would be expected to bear). In his reply (copy attached at Annex B) the Governor indicated that subject to the clarification of four particular points he would be

prepared to accept the suggested post-1971 training flight

visits as very much a second best alternative to the stationing

of a fighter unit in the Colony.

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