TNAG-0179-FCO40-215-Strength-of-Hong-Kong-Garrison-1970 — Page 224

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hostilities in the area the Seventh Fleet would, if necessary,

intervene.

4$.

An overt attack by the Chinese is less likely than an

attempt to get the Colony by subversion. Our ability to

preserve law and order depends essentially on maintaining the

confidence of the Chinese population in the British intention

to stay. The majority are politically inarticulate. Their

wish is to trade and survive. They do not wish to be on the

losing side and once their confidence started to slip the

process would be accumulative and there would be an increasing

tendency to transfer allegiance to Peking.

Garrison

54. At the end of 1966 British military forces in the Colony

were 63 major Army units, four fighter aircraft and three

coastal minesweepers.

6 The Army units were to have been reduced to 5% major units

during 1967-68; but this decision was never publicly announced

never

implemented

and has been indefinitely postponed because of the disturbeduces

has

in 1967.

conditions in the Colony last year. The garrison was in fact

reinforced by one battalion from Singapore during the earlier

stages of the disturbances last year and its strength remained

at 7 major units until June, 1968, when one, battalion was with-

March

The naval vessels

drawn. The fighter aircraft were withdrawn in 1967 and air

cover has since been provided from Singapore.

have been (which were to have been withdrawn) are being retained.

Future Garrison

Her Majesty's Government's decision to withdraw their

Forces from Singapore and Malaysia by the end of 1971 will

mean that it will thereafter not be possible to reinforce

the Hong Kong Garrison from those sources in time of need.

2

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