STATE
Chry to Defence Supty Dajat.
MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
MAIN BUILDING, WHITEHALL, LONDON, S.W
TELEPHONE WHITEHALL 7022
TARY OF
SECRET
RECORD OF DISCUSSION BETWEEN THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR DEFENCE AND THE GOVERNOR OF HONG KONG
ON 25TH JUNE, 1969.
Present:
The Rt. Hon. Denis Healey MP
{
Mr. F. Cooper
Mr. A.R.M. Jaffray
Lt.-Col. A. Higson, RM.
H.E. the Governor,
Sir David Trench. Commander British Forces,
Lt-Gen. Sir Basil Eugster Colonial Secretary,
Sir Hugh Norman-Walker Commissioner of Police,
Mr. C.P. Sutcliffe Political Adviser,
Mr. A. P. Maddocks
Defence Secretary,
Mr. A.
Todd
Director of Special Branch,
Mr. E.K.I. O'Reilly
Security Background
The Governor explained that the Communists were exercising a considerable degree of control over the
The sensitive Goverment at present by non-violent means. arças were, first, the press, which continued to print seditiou and subversive articles; second, the Communist schools which took in about 2.4% of the school population and were expanding (though infiltration into the non-communist schools was only Blight); and third, the border, where incidents could blow up at any moment, There was at present a lull, which the Gover- ment was trying to exploit. Their general policy was one of
The Communists were also in no provocation and no kow-towing.
a dilemma since they could not keep the Colony too firmly on a string without violence, which would ruin its usefulness to themselves.
1
า
Hunters
2.
1.
It was against this background that the Government had asked for Hunter aircraft. The history went back to 1950, when Chinese Nationalist aircraft had intruded into Hong Kong
The RAF air space in order to bomb the mainland of China. had been employed to keep them off. If, RAF fighters were now withdrawn, the Communist Chinese could claim - although there had not been an incursion of Nationalist aircraft since 1950 - that there was a gap in their air cover which they were
/entitled
Original: HKLIL10/9_
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