TNAG-0165-FCO40-201-Export-of-textiles-to-Norway-and-Sweden-1969 — Page 23

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taking such action in place of the present restraints she

had imposed and the U.S. were likely to take some type of restrictive

action. He repeated that if Hong Kong continued to concede restraints

•

the U.K. would have to take restrictive action also and he did not

see why this could not be taken under Article XIX.

Mr. Hughes said that he was not sure it would be in the interest

Leaving aside the U.S. question which was

of the U.K. to do this.

a political commitment and would not in any way be affected by what

was agreed between Hong Kong and Sweden (although the Americans might

use any such agreement to support their own case) he asked Mr. Jordan

what were the possibilities of gaining a little time. Could he not

negotiate in Stockholm without definitely concluding the agreement

i.e. ad referendum.

Mr. Jordan replied that he would be most reluctant to do so as

Hong Kong had already reserved its position once, and Mr. Carter

commented that agreement ad referendum was usually on a point on

which there had been no negotiating instruction.

Mr. Jordan said that it seemed to him to be out of the question

that he should go to Stockholm, reach an agreement ad referendum

and then the Swedes should be told that Hong.Kong were not going

to put it into practice after all. Was it being suggested that the

principle of restraints was unacceptable and that the U.K. wished

to throw this principle out?

Mr. Stewart said this, was not the case. It was felt that however

that on shirts, for example, the case was different and should be

dealt with under Article XIX.

Mr. Jordan said that surely whenever there was an Article XIX

case there was also a case for restraint.

When Hong Kong became

aware that a restraint case existed she had long accepted that she

/should