A
HONG
5 4
KONG
PALL
Our Ref: 30/376CD
R&R.
57
Recendo of meanings of 13×25/6 are p
GOVERNMENT OFFICE files.
on
differnt
files. If
Cope the
MALL LONDON S.W.. to, pé
Hong Kong Department,
London, S.W.1.
LAST
17th October, 1969.
Copies & HKK6/29 to botte
H.H. Stewart, Esq.,
Foreign & Commonwealth Office, King Charles Street,
REF
NEX
REF.
60
NICK6/531/1
his dem Herbert,
171
Мих 20/10
R
f
200CT 1969
May I refer to the draft records prepared by the Board of Trade covering the meetings chaired by Hughes on M2th/13th and 23rd June this year at which David Jordan was present? Pressure of work has prevented David from going through these drafts previously but he has now asked me to say that, although many of the differences between them and Hong Kong's records are slight, there are certain omissions which are important and which he feels should be brought to your attention.
In the case of the record of the meetings on 12th/ 13th June, both he and I have noted the omission of his reply to Hughes' question at the top of the third page as to whether Hong Kong would consider action by H.M.G. on 1JXX 394 similar lines to that taken by Sweden as appropriate in
B
parallel circumstances. In addition to the remarks quoted in the record, David went on to say.that the situation could never be parallel because of the special relationship between Hong Kong and the United Kingdom, which imposed on H.M.G. a responsibility for the preservation and expansion of Hong Kong's trade.
The most important omission on 13th June is of course David's remark towards the end; "this means that the existing policy on voluntary restraints is re-confirmed" and the fact that no one questioned this statement.
On the record of the meeting on 23rd June we both have rather more extensive comments. In the remarks attributed to David on page 3 there is no reference to the argument put forward by him that where Hong Kong was satisfied that an Article XIX-type injury situation existed, we preferred to negotiate export restraints rather than let the importing country take Article XIX action, (which could involve cutbacks and import control) because the former allowed Hong Kong to negotiate reasonable levels and to retain export control, which ensured full utilisation of the quota and placed definite business advantages in the hands of Hong Kong exporters. Hong Kong therefore at present preferred these limited restraints to the prospect of a C.T.A. type agreement on non-cottons because Article 3 puts the balance of power on the importing country's side through giving them the right to take unilateral action to restrict imports if no agreement could be reached.
TELEPHONE 01-930-7951
CABLES HONGAID LONDON S.W.I
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