CONFIDENTIAL
has already notified the French restrictions in ite submission on NTBs to
the CTIP. But more important, I think, is that to raise the question in
the Residual Restrictions Group would give the French the opportunity to
argue that Hong Kong was not (at least in their view) a developing country
and that, therefore, the forum was not relevant. We would not want to get
ourselves sidetracked into an argument of that sort. But I am afraid,
nevertheless, that the Residual Restrictions Group will be the first
opportunity that arises, probably sometime in February or early March.
8. Furthermore, whatever the forum might be, we would always need to be
prepared for the French to widen the debate by introducing accusations of
over-competitiveness, "social dumping", etc., against Hong Kong. Indeed,
they might well try to re-open the whole question of "market disruption" in
the context of the GATT, an issue which has lain fairly dormant since a
Working Party report was considered in November, 1960, following which the
concept of "market disruption" was taken up specifically only in relation
to cotton textiles.
9. There are also other dangers that we must bear in mind before taking
action that could hurt French amour propre, hypocritical as this may well be.
The tentative steps being taken towards the establishment of an EXC Common
Commercial Policy could contain both dangers and opportunities for Hong Kong.
at least on the surface the treatment of Hong Kong by all five other members
of the Community is liberal and this stands in marked contrast to the French
attitude. we want to work towards a situation where, within the framework
of a common commercial policy, the French are induced to move in the
direction of the Five' by removing at least the element of discrimination in
their restrictions on Hong Kong rather than for the Five to be persuaded to
move more in the direction of the French. In this situation, it may well
be that "softly, softly" is the best policy but on the other hand, there
are undoubtedly elements in the Five who would welcome it if we were to
strengthen their hand by putting our own separate pressure on the French
in a GATT context.
/10.
CONFIDENTIAL
No comments yet.
Private notes are available after approval.