CONFIDENTIAL
2
OF THE TEXTILE PROBLEM.
4. THE PROPOSED EASING OF ESCAPE CLAUSE CRITERIA AND EXTENSION OF U.S. RETALIATORY POWERS MAKE THIS A LESS DESIRABLE PACKAGE OF ELGISLATION FROM THE POINT OF VIEW OF U.S. TRADING PARTNERS. THE
TARIFF COMMISSION HAS DEMONSTRATED PEMARKABLE INCONSISTENCY IN
INTERPRETING THE EXISTING CRITERIA BUT WILL RESUMABLY BE FAIRLY
EASILY CONVINCED THAT INCREASED IMPORTS ARE THE PRIMARY CAUSE OF
INJURY TO A DOMESTIC INDUSTRY. IF SO, ESCAPE CLUSE ACTIONS MAY
PROLIFERATE. IF THE LEGISLATION IS ENACTED THERE WILL ALSO BE CONSIDERABLE PRESSURE ON THE ADMINISTRATION AND WITHIN IT TO USE THE NEW RETALIATORY POWERS AS A DECLARED THREAT TO OTHER COUNTRIES.
THE PRESIDENT'S OBJECT IS TO STRENGTHEN HIS NEGOTIATING STANCE, BUT OTHER COUNTRIES MAY NOW WELCOME THREATS OF U.S. ACTION GOING BEYOND WHAT IS PERMISSIBLE UNDER THE G.A.T.T. IT WOULD
FROBABLY BE BETTER FOR ALL CF US IF FUTURE U.S. ADMINISTRATIONS
DID NOT HAVE SUCH FAR-REACHING POWERS.
*
F.C.O. PASS UKNIS GENEVA UKDEL BRUSSELS HONG KONG AND SAVING TO
UKDEL OECD TOKYO BONN ROME AND PARIS.
MR. FREEMAN.
[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]
INTERNATIONAL TRADE DISTRIBUTION
TR. POL. DEPT.
AMERICAN DEPT.
GGGGG.
CONFIDENTIAL
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