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though for what it is worth we would certainly encourage them to remain firm rather than (as at one stage suggested e.g. in N Of Washington telegram No. 60) to soften. One argument which may
carry some weight with the Japanese is that if they agree restraints with the Americans this will make it more difficult for us to carry through the liberalisation which we have proposed of our trade with them. I have in fact spoken in this sense to the Japanese here (our Telegram No. 633 to Tokyo). We can probably do little more but see how the Japanese fare during their Prime Minister's visit to Washington.
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If therefore, as we hope, the possibility of comprehensive bilateral agreements remains blocked by the. Japanese, the next alternative for the U.S. would be the "selective bilateral approach". We are less disposed to acquiesce in this solution than we were until recently. Apart from the indications that the Japanese are standing firm, the upshot of the meeting in Geneva between U.S., Hong Kong and U.K. representatives was to show, as the Hong Kong representatives agreed, just how unconvincing the Americans' case was. If therefore we encouraged the Americans to look towards the "selective bilateral approach" in any high-level message, we might get ourselves into a difficult situation i.e. sitting round a table with the U.s. demonstrating that their figures did not justify any restraint of trade, but nevertheless being under some compulsion to give them something, if we were not. to leave them feeling that we had led them up the garden path.
5. Thus, any message to the President could only point to the multilateral approach, which the Japanese themselves have recommended to the Americans (para. 2 of Tokyo telegram 611). You will have seen (U.K.Mis. Geneva telegrams 23 to Hong Kong and 543 to the F.C.0.) that the E.E.C. put forward in the Geneva meetings the idea of a GATT Study, to which we gave some support. There is thus, in embryo, a common position between the Japanese, the E.E.C. and ourselves and we will do our best to develop this. But a little time will be needed to work this proposal up into something more substantial, and it is not something which could be effectively mentioned in a top-level message at this stage.
6. To sum up, we doubt whether at this stage there is anything we could put into a message from the Prime Minister which would deflect the Americans from their present course, and we would not wish the Prime Minister to send a message which seemed likely simply to be ignored. Such a message after all would be our last major card and we ought not to play it unless and until we are sure that it would have a good chance of influencing the outcome.
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17. We
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