TNAG-0146-FCO40-182-Exports-of-textiles-to-United-States-of-America-1969 — Page 12

CONFIDENTIAL

CYPHER/CAT’A’.

PRIORITY WASHINGTON

ELEGRAM NO.2714

CONFIDENTIAL.

TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

7 OCTOBER 1969

AT

NEUTRAL.

ADDRESSED TO F.C.O. TELEGRAM NO.2714 OF 7 OCTOBER REPEATED FOR

INFORMATION TO HONG KONG AND SAVING TO TOKYO UKMIS GENEVA AND OTTAWA.

MY TELEGRAM NO.62 TO' HONG KONG.

ú.s.

U.S. TEXTILE IMPORTS.

I HAVE CAREFULLY CONSIDERED WHAT MIGHT BE DONE AT THIS LATE STAGE

TO BRING HOME TO THE AMERICANS THE SERIOUS CONSEQUENCES WHICH WILL

ENSUE IF THEY PERSIST IN DEMANDING COMPREHENSIVE RESTRAINTS. I

BELIEVE THAT ONLY A DETERMINED EFFORT BY THE COUNTRIES CONCERNED-

TO CET THROUGH TO THE PRESIDENT DIRECTLY HAS ANY. CHANCE OF SUCCESS.

MY REASONS ARE AS FOLLOWS:

2. THE DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE MAKES ALL THE RUNNING IN PRESSING

FOR RESTRAINTS GOING WELL BEYOND THOSE FOR WHICH ANY ECONOMIC

JUSTIFICATION EXISTS. THE OTHER GOVERNMENT AGENCIES CONCERNED

ACQUIESCE WITH VARIOUS DEGREES OF ENTHUSIASM OR RELUCTANCE. THE

STATE DEPARTMENT AND THE SPECIAL TRADE REPRESENTATIVE ALMOST

CERTAINLY HOPE THAT THE COMMERCE DEPARTMENT WILL FAIL BUT THEY DO

NOT SEEM TO HAVE BEEN ABLE TO MUSTER EITHER THE COURAGE OR THE

INFLUENCE TO DIVERT MR. STANS. THE PRESIDENT HAS GIVEN HIS BLESSING TO MR. STANS, BUT WE DO NOT KNOW HOW CLOSELY THE PRESIDENT HAS BEEN ADVISED ON THE WEAKNESSES OF THE ECONOMIC JUSTIFICATION

FOR COMPREHENSIVE RESTRAINTS OR OF THE DEGREE OF RISK FOR LIBERAL TRADING ARRANGEMENTS IN GENERAL. IN PARTICULAR, THOUGH MR. STANS CLAIMS TO HAVE A POSITIVE DIRECTION FROM THE PRESIDENT TO BE

/CONTENT WITH NOTHING

CONFIDENTIAL