7.
The President, in reply, said that the policy of the U.K. Government was also to move towards the relaxation of travel restrictions and outward investment, but that, because of our balance of trade situation, no relaxations were at present feasible. He confirmed that the U.K. welcomed irward investment from the U.S. and that the restrictions imposed by the previous Administration made a valuable Solitribution to -UK: technology, productivity and exports.
Lapislation
8.
Kr. Stars said that the Administration were currently preparing legislation to provide for the abolition of ASP, relaxation of the criteria for escapeolause action end adjustment assistance and Presidential tariff regotiating powers, but . said that the probablity of getting the package through Congress would depend to a large extent on the results of his discussions on his European tour and in particular on whether a solution could be found to the textile problem.
9. The President stressed the importance we attached to the abolition of ASP which
If the U.S. failed to had long been a running sore in European/U.S. relations. abolish ASP we would be subjected to increasingly strong preasures from our own industry, particularly the plastics industry who wished us to raise tariffs to the EEC level.
Adjustment Assistance
10.
The President said that we had possibly more ancient and declining industries then any other country. We had gone to great lengths to find methods, some more effective than others, of helping such industries to restructure and modernise
Mr. Štans said it would be helpful. themselves including a strong regional policy.
to the Administration, if and when it came to ask Congress for similar measures, to know the details of measures adoptéd and the costs of such a policy. The President said that he would let him have what details he could.
Preferences
11.
The President asked when the U.S. expected to be able to supply the list of. offers of preferemes for the l.d.c.'s which they, together with the other
It was pointed out that developed countries, had agreed to produce by 1st Match. they had agreed to use their best erdeavours to provide this information on time, and that their failure to do so meant that the developed countries would be faced with an extremely difficult UNCTAD meeting this summer.
12.
The difficulties were appreciated, said Kr. Stans, but work on the U.S. offer was not yet complete. However, he know that President Nixon was inclined to take a
It was emphasised that any offer produced sympathetic view of the problem.
by the U.S. would have to be realistic, and a list should be ready at least by the Autumn. We were challenged on our attitude to reverse preferences. Our reply was that our action would be governed by what general preferences were offered; wo would have to see whether the Commonwealth countries concerned benefitted Bufficiently from the general preferences finally agreed to justify our removing our special arrangements with these countries.
/13.
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