TNAG-0143-FCO40-179-Exports-of-textiles-to-United-States-of-America-1969 — Page 136

CONFIDENTIAL

.2.

BEING PREPARED TO SEE THIS PACKAGE OPENED. IT HAD ALREADY BEEN

WRAPPED UP AND WAS SURELY NOT RENEGOTIABLE.

i

6., GREENWALD THEN SUGGESTED THAT AN AGREEMENT ON WOOLLENS

WOULD BE ADVANTAGEOUS TO OUR INDUSTRY. I ASKED WHETHER HE WERE

PROPOSING SOME SPECIALLY FAVOURABLE QUOTA FOR THE U.K. WHICH I

THOUGHT COULD NOT BE SOLD MULTILATERALLY. I ADDED THAT, EVEN IF

BRADFORD SAW SOME SHORT TERM ADVANTAGE HERE, THEY PROBABLY DID -

NOT APPRECIATE THE DIFFICULTY OF ANY ARRANGEMENT WHICH WOULD

DISCRIMINATE IN OUR FAVOUR. MOREOVER, H.M.G. WAS CONCERNED WITH

THE WIDER ISSUE OF LIBERAL TRADE.

7.

GREENWALD REPLIED THAT THE BRITISH INDUSTRY WOULD BENEFIT

FROM THE REMOVAL OF THE PRESSURE OF JAPANESE WOOLLENS IN THE U.S.

MARKET. MOREOVER, IT WAS A SORE POINT FOR THE AMERICANS THAT,

WHILE BRITAIN BENEFITED FROM RESTRAINT ARRANGEMENTS UNDER OUR

TREATY WITH JAPAN, THE U.S. WERE SUBJECTED TO THE FULL FORCE OF

JAPANESE COMPETITION, IT WAS NOT UNREASONABLE TO ASK US TO TAKE

THIS INTO ACCOUNT. NOR, SINCE WE DID OPERATE SOME RESTRICTIVE

ARRANGEMENTS WITH JAPAN, WAS IT OPEN TO US TO ARGUE, AS I HAD BEEN

DOING, AGAINST THE WHOLE PRINCIPLE OF VOLUNTARY RESTRAINT.

8. I REPLIED THAT I WAS NOT AS FAMILIAR AS I SHOULD BE WITH THE

DETAILS OF OUR JAPANESE TREATY BUT THAT WE WOULD, IN ANY CASE,

THINK IT QUITE WRONG TO ARGUE FROM THE EXISTENCE OF RESTRAINT IN

A PARTICULAR AREA TO THE SPREADING OF THE DAMAGE MORE GENERALLY.

WE WERE, AFTER ALL, ABSORBING FAR MORE TEXTILE IMPORTS THAN THE

U.S. OUR OWN INDUSTRY HAD BEEN CONSIDERABLY WEAKENED IN THE

PROCESS WHILE THE U.S. INDUSTRY, AT THIS MOMENT, LOOKED VERY

STRONG OVER THE WHOLE FIELD. OUR GENERAL THINKING WAS POINTED

IN QUITE THE OPPOSITE DIRECTION FROM THE WAY TREZISE AND GREENWALD

HAD BEEN TALKING. I INSTANCED OUR RECENT KENNEDY ROUND ACCELERATION

OFFER.

CONFIDENTIAL

/N.P. 9. I PRESUME