TNAG-0142-FCO40-178-Long-term-policy-on-International-trade-in-textiles-1969 — Page 73

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perhaps Norbom also, preferred that if anything had to be

done on nun-cotton textiles, it should be within the frame-

werk of the CTA. Salib at one point said that a two-year

extension of the CTA might provide enough time to settle

the non-cotton problem. When I said that the Americans would

almost certainly not accept that sort of time period he said

that one way might be to have a short-term arrangement on

non-cottons which would later be incorporated into a revised

CTA. I did not comment specifically on this but I did say that, if it came to the crunch and Hong Kong was forced to

accept any wide-ranging restraints on non-crtton textiles, we

considered it to be in our interests that this should be done

within the framework of the CTA and with full recogniti on

of the one market concept and roll-in.

U.K. Attitude

12. Norbom askea whether the U.K. attitude was similar to

Hong Kong's, I pointed out that there were naturally some

differences between them considering the differences in their

situations. But such differences as there were were being

ironed out through close consultations between the two

governments. As I understood it, the U.K. attitude was that

it was opposed to any extension of restraints on non-nottens

and that, although it would go along with a short extension

of the CTA as regards cottons alcne, it would not shed any

tears if the CTA were to disappear. Both Norbom and Salib

replied that they could not understand this attitude.

would be put in the place of the CTA? I replied that, sc

far as I understood the position, the U.K. Government felt that it should rely on the tariff (including the proposed new tariff on Commonwealth cotton textiles) and that quantitative

restrictions should be done away with, provided this was

accepted by other major importing countries.

What

Norbom and

/Salib

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