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I replied that this might be the theoretical deadline but
the practical one would be several months earlier as there
would otherwise be considerable danger of uncertainty and
disruption of trade. He also threw out the idea that it
might be possible for importing and exporting countries to
get together and agree on the broad lines of improvements
in bilateral arrangements which could be elaborated in
figures later. I replied that I did not think this would
work out in practice. It was only in the course of actual
detailed negotiations that arrangements acceptable to both
sides could be worked out; and neither importing nør
exporting countries would want to commit themselves too far in
advance
these.
9. Instead, I suggested that the best thing to do now in
preparation for the December meeting would be to speak to the
representatives of at least all the main importing and
exporting countries anu to draw together their ideas; this
might produce quite a bit of cross-fertilisation of views.
They said that they would naturally do this but that some
delegations did not necessarily have the knowledge to speak
with any authority, e.g., the Americans, whese main operators
in the CTC normally came from Washington. I replied that
there should really be no difficulty about this; the
Permanent Missions would just have to seek instructions from
their capitals. The same applied, for instance, to the
Japanese who could normally make no move without receiving
full instructions from Tokyo.
Non-Cottons
10. With regard to non-cottons Salib said he had heard that
the Americans now seemed to be mere willing to discuss their
problems within the general GATT context. I replied that we
had heard nothing about this; the U.S. still seemed to be
/wedded
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