TNAG-0135-FCO40-171-Tariff-preferences-for-developing-countries-1969 — Page 35

CONFIDENTIAL

5.

The situation was further exacerbated by the fact that

di Martino (who returned to Brussels after the first two days)

misunderstood Kemmis support of the U.S. proposal to mean

that the U.K. had gone back on their intention to table the

substance of their own March submission. There was a rumour,

which later turned out to be partly true, that the U.S. was

lobbying in capitals to try to persuade other prospective

donors not to table individual "illustrative" offers in

UNCTAD. The EEC believed that this was being done behind

their backs and that the U.K. had, once again in accordance

with the myth, succumbed to U.S. pressure. As a result a

message got through to Brussels and Tran telephoned Goldsmith

in London to complain that the U.K. had gone back on their

previous intention as a result of Kemmis' interventions at the

Paris meeting. Goldsmith firmly refuted this allegation

in fact up to then there had been no American démarche in

London, although one was reported later in the week in Brussels.

But the seeds of distrust had been sown and it took much of

the rest of the week to dig them up.

Beneficiary Countries

6.

On the third day, after I had arrived, the Group was

going through the draft of Part II of the Report. When the

section on Beneficiary Countries (page 23) was reached the

atmosphere became very tense. The EEC, the Americans and the

Japanese all indicated that they could not necessarily continue

to accept the wording of the Special Group of Four on the self-

election principle - "any country, territory or region claiming

to be less developed"- and that they might have to make

exceptions. After consultations with me Kemmis then made a

strong statement reaffirming the U.K.'s adherence to the self-

election principle and to the fact that prior exclusion should

not be based on "competitive considerations". He then

CONFIDENTIAL

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