TNAG-0135-FCO40-171-Tariff-preferences-for-developing-countries-1969 — Page 150

CONFIDA.

(c)

On the other hand it was pointed out that while the administrative difficulties of duty quotes were not insuperable they were nonetheless real and there was little point in adopting a system which would give rise to troublesome legal and practical problems before we had to. All quota systems inevitably involved bureaucratic control, rigidity and unfairness. Prior allocation was the least satisfactory way of operating a duty quota since it would not be possible to devise and demonstrate a method of allocation which would be completely fair to all and it was undesirable to freeze trade patterns. It should also be borne in mind that, because the EEC tariff contained fewer sub-headings than ours, their 40 or so sub-headings containing sensitive items could cover quite a large proportion of imported

manufactures.

50,

(a) If the EEC, who were certain to do and other developed countries refused to acknowledge the principle of self-election and regard Hong Kong as a developing country there was no effective counter move we could make. There would be advantages in trying to get Taiwan and South Korea treated on the same basis as Hong Kong. Our interest was to see that Hong Kong was not treated less favourably by importing countries generally than comparable exporters in order to reduce the burden on our industries. On the other hand it might be argued by other countries that United Kingdom already had off-setting advantages for its exports in Hong Kong, and the extent to which the generalised preference arrangements could be considered equitable depended upon the sharing of new, rather than existing, burdens. There was in any case a limit to what we could do for Hong Kong, and we "imit to oral' be conde, should not wish to wreck the scheme for tariff preferences for developing But the army in what are ba

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countries or to invite trouble by making other selective exclusions because

It might be easier to we were unable to cater for all its interests.

withdraw certain categories of products from our offer rather than attempting to exclude particular countries, but this was bound up with the question of whether to adopt duty quota or a tariff reduction with exceptions

approach.

(e) Further explanation of the "competitive need approach" likely to

be adopted by the United States would be required when the paper was submitted

to Ministers.

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DTIDEUTHAN

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