CONFIDENTIA I
too many changes. The E. B. C. is to provide paper
textiles in the context of preferences for the next meeting of the tise Group and it say well contain this proposition. Ey first reaction is that this would be an empty gesture likely only to benefit the importers in the doner coun tries. It could intensify pries disruption, if such already exista, and will surely draw strong opposition from the Japanese. You may oure to bear this possible development in sind in preparing for the C.Z.C.
Reverting to the session itself, it was interesting - and slightly disconcerting - to hear de Geer, on behalf of the Nordies, insinuate into his presentation the now familiar refrain about the possibility of recourse to unilateral safeguard notion “in accordance with the provisions of GAST". This same out as he was stresaing the gaɛerosity of the Fordie offer and their consequent vulnerability to market disruption. For this reason, he argued, they laid great stress on safeguards, including reversion to m.fn, duties and recourse to other sensuros under GA T, such action being restricted to “those cou:tries gausing the difficulty". Under questioning, he conceded that this might mena in effect that imports from developing countries" causing difficulty" might be more restristed than they were before prefermine was accorded. The wiss representative seemed to find this concept appealing and foresaw that developing countries, under the great inducement of tarlíf preferences, might over-invest in a particular industry to the point where a reversion to .f.lle treatment would be inadequate protection. This is patent nensense, of course, but it does point to a dangerous train of thought which we must watch. It would be unfortunate if inclusim in a preference sakeste vere to lead us into a mesh of so-called Article XIX type si tum LåOKS and pressures for voluntary restraints. Refere eo wa made by de Gour
to the relevance of the GATT Decision of 15th November, 1960 on market disruption; which as we know ia poi a decision and has no legal validity other than that soaruing in the field of cotton textiles from its inclusion in Annaze C to he C.T.A. It would be unfortunate if this gained credence as a justification for restraint by the back door of preference safeguards.
the credit mide, de Coer stressed Gordie dediention to the principle that the fact some developing countries vere already competitive was not justification for exceptions; and that they mvisaged accepting "bona fide claims to developing status. The AmerÍOmas asked
if reference to developing countries implied the ordion did not mviongo extending the sakome to "awatomm territories”. This question was duaked
Geer whe asid they had net thought about 1: but assumed it would considered in the Ad Hoa Group is du
Courne.
from our point of view, the dinou.anions on Austrian and Zealand offers vere of marginal interest; and the Irish offer vas scarcely considered because their delegate disarmingly introduced it by informing the group he was not briefed!
Canadiana
de a reference to their intention to restrict preferences to those developing countries who offer m.f.н. treatmmt to Canda (this lets out such add bedfellows as smudi (rabia and Albania) and net to offer preferences on items where there existed voluntary export restraints; und, where such restraints were from tine to time requested, to withdraw prefermoe. Under questioning from the American and Japanese
/delegations,
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