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In

(c) Presentational argument: With other donors, in particular the USA and Japan, we can argue the case in (b) above, and refer in passing to (a) and can add that in these

circumstances it cannot be expected that we should open our

market significantly more than the EEC are doing. We can also

argue that the problem of evaluation has no ready solution

and we have to be sure for the sake of the Commonwealth that

we are doing no more than the EEC, although if the EEC are-

prepared to improve their offers so of course are we.

the Commonwealth we can use the same argument, that they are

obtaining advantages in the EEC that will compensate them to the extent necessary for the loss of their advantages in the U.K: the USA and Japan and perhaps some others will adjust their offers to some sort of parity with the EEC, but this we cannot

avoid. With domestic industry we can say that we are doing no

more than the EEC and that this can be clearly demonstrated,

and that the volumes of duty free imports from developing countries

There is reason will be limited to a pre-determined amount.

to think they will accept this, particularly because they would

have little faith in any general safeguard arrangement.

21.

The main objection to this course is that the value of free entry limited by duty quotas is much less for developing countries than the unrestricted free entry proposed in our 1st March sub-

If the mission on the analogy of Commonwealth preference. developing countries react unfavourably to the Community's offer they would also blame the U.K. equally for offering very limited preferences. Our answer to this is suggested in paragraph 20(c)

above.

Another objection is the reaction to be expected from the other countries in the OECD to complete withdrawal of the

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