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jeopardised by the grant of preferences to developing countries. Almost alone, at New Delhi, they expressed the view that processed agricultural products should be excluded from any scheme.
12. The Scandinavian countries now firmly support a generous preferential regime (only the Danes did so four years ago). They are prepared to grant duty free entry with very limited exceptions.
13. The Swiss are nervous about the possible effects of a further breach in the m.f.n. principle. They have said that they find it extremely difficult to determine exceptions from the grant of preferential treatment. To concede the case for one Swiss industry weakens the grounds for resisting demands for similar treatment from other Swiss industries. At the meeting of the OECD Trade Committee on 10/11 October, they put forward the suggestion that there should be no exceptions within chapters 25-29 of the BN but that the preferential margins should be a modest 25% with a promise to review this margin after the preference-giving countries had had some experience of the new system.
14. A particular preoccupation of the Austrians is the political embarrassment which would result for them if one or more neighbouring East European countries claimed the status of developing countries. The Austrians also support Japanese insistence that preferences should not be given to the "competitive" exports of developing countries.
The British Position
15. At the first UNCTAD Conference in 1964, the UK and Denmark were the only countries wholeheartedly to support the principle of granting tariff preferences on manufactures and semi-manufactures to developing countries. The French and the Belgians were in favour of granting preferences on a selective basis in respect both of products and countries when it seemed that such concessions were likely to be use- ful to the countries concerned. The French subsequently abandoned this line - the so-called Brasseur plan as being politically untenable. The Belgians have made no secret of their opinion that adoption of this "plan" would be the best way of moeting insistent pressure from developing countries for tariff concessions. Most of the other Western countries expressed strong objection to departures from the m.f.n. principle. As the foregoing will have made clear, the posi- tion has changed out of all recognition since then.
16.
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Our own support for preferences in 1964 was conditional. We put forward three main conditions:-
(i) that the major industrilised countries
should act in concert;
(ii) that Commonwealth countries should waive
their contractual rights in our market to the extent necessary to enable us to give preferences to non-Commonwealth develop- ing countries;
(iii) that the grant of preferences should not impede further tariff reductions on an m.f.n. basis.
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