TNAG-0132-FCO40-168-Tariff-preferences-for-developing-countries-1969 — Page 98

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Indeed, I

Mueller-

quite apart from the serious political implications involved.

would even go so far as to regard it as an "unfriendly act".

Thuns, who took a sympathetic attitude, said that he hoped we would

understand that the attitude being adopted by the Community was certainly

not at the instance of Germany. He confirmed that, at meetings of the

Six on this subject, Germany had been placed in a minority of one in pressing

for the inclusion of Hong Kong. He added that Germany had similarly been

in a minority over the question of tariff quotas. She would have preferred

the use of more normal exclusions and escape clause provisions in a greater

number of cases and the relegation of tariff quotas tu a supporting role

He confirmed that the Belgians were extremely strong

in certain instances.

on keeping out Hong Kong and that they had never really dropped their

adherence to the Brasseur Plan. The French had also come down pretty

strongly in favour of Hong Kong's exclusion. I asked him what the attitude

of the Dutch had been and he said that they had, to all intents and purposes,

gone along with the Belgians and French and had certainly not given any

support to the German position. The Italians had also gene along and

had said very little. (Subsequently, Goldsmith told me that it had been

gathered in London that Wintermans

insc far as he has any real influence,

which is unlikely had been overruled and that Verhagen, in particular,

had put his weight

behind supporting the exclusion of Hong Kong.

6. All this shows that fairly substantial discussions have already taken

place between the Member States without in any way shifting the position

taken up initially by the Commission; and my conclusion is that there may be

little that can now be done to alter the Community's position on this

question, whether by H.M.G. or by ourselves. If this is the case, we

shall have to seriously consider the consequences.

United States

7.

Considering the ease with which American officials usually discuss most

issues, those concerned with the question of preferences have been displaying considerable reticence in talking about what the U.S. might eventually

concede.

Despite the fact that we had several talks with individual

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/members