TNAG-0132-FCO40-168-Tariff-preferences-for-developing-countries-1969 — Page 86

CONFIDENTIAL

The discussion centred on the conditions under which safeguards would be invoked other than through at initio limitations by quotas and ceilings. Again it was difficult to get very far because some delegations, and once more notably the U.S., were not prepared to reveal their hand before the tabling of lists on March 1st. Goldsmith, from the Chair, said that it would be necessary to come to some understanding on this question among prospective donor countries as the developing countries would undoubtedly raise it at an early stage and would probably propose the establishment of a group to study it. He pointed out that the question at issue was not so much safeguards as the circumstances in which preferences would be withdrawn. In this connection it should not be forgotten that a quota

system provided for automatic withdrawal.

6. The ensuing debate revealed some differences of opinion, but eventually there appeared to be a broad consensus on something like the following lines:-

(a) as the preferences scheme would not involve legal obligations

towards the developing countries, the procedure for withdrawing the offers in appropriate circumstances would not involve formal obligations on the lines of e.g. Article XIX or Article XXVIII of the GATT;

(b) the difficulties involved in establishing in advance objective

criteria justifying the withdrawal of preferences, as suggested by the developing countries, were too great to recommend this type of

approach;

(c) the reasons for withdrawal would, therefore, have to be essentially

subjective, but should be linked to a finding of injury or threat of injury;

in this connection some delegations favoured the use of

a formula along the lines of the "serious injury" criterion of

Article XIX of the GATT;

CONFIDENTIAL

/(a)

;