TNAG-0132-FCO40-168-Tariff-preferences-for-developing-countries-1969 — Page 17

31. it was common ground among the members of the Group that it would not be rible to introduce a scheme of special tariff treatment for developing countries which did not include some arrangements for withdrawal or modification in certain circumstances, possibly on a temporary basis. But thele were persisting differences of view about the desirability and feasibility of the various possible arrangements. 32. There were also differences about whether it would be necessary for the same or substantially similar arrangements to be adopted by all donor countries or whether it would be possible, assuming that it could be made consistent with the other principles generally accepted for different countries to adopt arrangements which they found individually suitable to their own circumstances.

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33. On these matters the Group are agreed that there should be further discussion acong prospective donor countries.

34. The Group agreed that whatever conclusion was eventually come to on these matters, existing anti-dumping provisions should still be applicable. They agreed also that regard must be paid to the possibility that the interests of third countries might be at risk through the effects of special tariff treatment, and that as part of the afrangements there should be ́provision for consultation and remedial action if appropriate against this contingency.

Phasing out and Duration of Special Tariff Treatment

35. The Group agreed on the importance of providing that the grant of any special tariff treatment should be temporary and subject to periodic review. Once special tariff treatment had been given the beneficiary countries would not share any general interest in m.f.n. tariff reductions and might even resist them in order to maintain their differential advantage. In order to avoid any misunderstanding, it should be made crystal clear that special tariff treatment was a waiver from the basic GATT rule and therefore not an obligation, and that it would not be allowed to stand in the way of m.f.n. tariff reductions if developed countries wished to

introduce them either unilaterally or after another round of international tariff negotiations.

36. It was admittedly easier to state as a principle that special tariff treatment should be temporary and degressive than it was to determine how this principle should be applied. As explained in paragraphs 25 and 26 above, the prospects that special `tariff treatment might be phased out as a result of the reduction of m.f.n. rates to the level of the special rates depend in part on the depth of tariff cuts granted to