TNAG-0132-FCO40-168-Tariff-preferences-for-developing-countries-1969 — Page 167

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contret the broad lines of the Borniceion's recommendation and I imagine you vill bo equally feniliar with them.) He hoped that any 'competition' between prospective preference donors would be positive - 1.0., designed to Increase rather than reduce the substance of the initial illustrative offend - and stressed that the position of the United States would be all importent in thia recpoet. The Commission would not be able to persuade ita clients to be as forthcoming as, for political reasons, they rould wish 12 the Amoriqun offer was not comparable in scope (the difficulty of comparing tariff roductions and tariff quotas in this rospect was recognised without any positivă ideas for solving the problem 'coming to light). Di Martino statod in this connection that tho scope of the United Kingdon offere would also be of great importance, and he suggested tint we meat to exchange idons before tabling our respostive lista in OECD. te acrocd to disenan this proposal again during the January meeting of the OECD trade committee.

LL. He referred briefly to the question of scrSTDO preferenced, on which it appears that the Conniculon's views are that they cannot enter into meaningful dipcubeton cf the fate of raverso preferences until they have a clearer idea of the possible scope of the U/07/D schone and of the advantussa 1t is likely to offer the 1.4.c. beneficiaries cr cxisting profurencca. I asked the Cockiccion repzorentatives how they thought the ronegotiation of the Yaoundé Convention would turn out. Their guess, on reverso preferences at least, was that "Yaoundé 2 would be noazon to Yaoundé 1 then to Yaoundé 3".

5. The impression which 41 Martino wes clearly trying to convey in this tour d'hondsen raz that the Commission were anxicus, foe political respons involved in their rolations with the developing countries on the question of preferences, at least as for as manuractures and effort towards cent-namfactures ere concerned (he was prqluet-bly negativo satisfying the on the agricultural side). He régonded a posežuly developing counrestrictive American offer en boing the major external

to make a substantial

'tries

cbotacle to achieving much a result; and he telcomed the fact that our own rosition was likely to be forthcoming, He stated frankly, that he regarded the cffurs cf other procpective doriors, with the possible excerption c2 Jepan, so largely irrelevant to the difficulties the Commission would have in selling a schone within the Community.

6. I en copying this letter to Morris and Phillips (Board of Trade) and shithead (500).

(2. Goldsmith)

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