TNAG-0132-FCO40-168-Tariff-preferences-for-developing-countries-1969 — Page 12

If the search for an acceptable formula to differentiate developed from developing countries was to be abandoned and a selection procedure discarded, only remaining possibility appeared to be "self-election".

12. Such a solution was far from ideal. Claims for qualifications would undoubtedly be put forward by countries which one or other of the donor countries would, if left to itself, have been reluctant to accept;" and which some of the beneficiary countries themselves would have been inclined to contest. Nonetheless, and in spite of its imperfections the Group have concluded that, as a basis for starting the arrangements and subject to the qualification in the following paragraph, all countries claiming to be developing should be given the advantage of any special tariff treatment. It is to be expected that no country will claim developing status unless there are bona fide grounds for it to do so; and that such a claim would be relinquished if those grounds ceased to exist.

13. Their consideration of this point has reinforced their conclusion on another point to which the Group attach great importance. This is their agreement that there should be no binding commitment to grant special tariff treatment. While waivers from Article I GATT obligations will have to be obtained before any new arrangements can be implemented, such waivers will by their nature only give doner countries the right to introduce special tariff treatment, even though it would no doubt be reasonable to expect that the terms of the waivers would place some limitations on the way in which that right may be exercised. But if the waiver imposes no obligation on a donor country to give any special tariff treatment at all, it follows that there can be no obligation to grant it to any particular country. Indeed, there may well be countries, although unquestionably developing, to which one or mere donor countries would not be prepared to extend special tariff treatment on grounds which are, in their view, compelling. It is also possible that a donor country at some future date might on similar grounds feel it necessary to withdraw the benefit of such treatment from a particular country. Such exclusions would not be based on competitive considerations, which would be dealt with under the procedure referred to in paragraphs 18 and 27-29 below.

14. Although the Group are strongly of the opinion that arrangements for special tariff treatment should not involve binding commitments, they agree that a means must be found to ensure that major donor countries do not refuse, either initially or

later, to accept the claims of individual countries to qualify for special tariff

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