Mr. Wilford
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at and.
Mr.
Hong Kong: Long Term Study
I have the following comments on the extremely
interesting draft paper attached to your minute of 7 November.
2. With respect, I think it most unlikely that Ministers
would be ready to take up even a position of principle on two
such hypothetical questions as to whether H.M.G. would be
prepared to remain a Colonial power in the special circum-
stances of Hong Kong up to the end of the century and perhaps
beyond, and to pay some form of rent for the territory.
3. As I see it, any review by Ministers at this stage of
the future of Hong Kong should have the following practical
objectives:-
(a) It should remind Ministers how formidable are the
difficulties which may lie ahead in Hong Kong.
But at
the same time it should seek to convince them that
officials are simply not proceeding short-sightedly
ahead but have thought about feasible precautions for
forestalling disaster.
(b) It should convince Ministers that there is no action
which they can take now which would make the problem of
Hong Kong less intractable for them and their successors
in the long term. (In other words Ministers could be
reassured that they will not be arraigned at the bar of
history for having missed obvious opportunities in 1969.)
/ (cd) It
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(c)
4.
It should obtain approval for a general approach to the
question of Hong Kong which could serve for guidance to
the Governor of Hong Kong, particularly if there is to
be a new incumbent next year, in deciding his administra-
tive policies. (This is an aspect the importance of
which Sir David Trench has stressed in the past. He has
pointed out that he is already faced with decisions,
e.g. in the matter of franchises, which require assumptions
about our future tenure of the Colony. He has also
argued that on moral grounds a whole new approach may be
required if we accept that the Colony is likely to come
under Communist rule within the next ten years.)
The general guide lines which I personally should like to
see endorsed are these:-
(a)
(b)
(c)
There is no prospect of our reaching agreement about the
future of Hong Kong with the present Chinese Government.
Any unilateral attempt on our part now to work towards some
new status for Hong Kong would lead to an immediate loss
of confidence within the Colony and could quickly be
disastrous.
If a more pragmatic Government were to emerge in China
we should consider the possibility of negotiating with
them new arrangements for Hong Kong. I had assumed that
such arrangements would be aimed at assuring a premature
but reasonably orderly and honourable withdrawal from
both the leased territories and the Colony.
Since reading
/ your minute
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- 2 -
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(a)
your minute I see, however, that it might also be worth
considering an extension of the lease. But the whole
matter is so hypothetical and subject to so many impon-
derables that it is doubtful if anything is to be gained
by attempting now a detailed assessment of the possibilities.
For the present, in administering the Colony we must assume,
and be seen to assume, that we shall be there at any rate
until 1997. (Even this date may shortly present diffi-
culties for planning purposes, e.g. over franchises and
careers for Government Servants but administrative means
must be found for overcoming these.)
(e) This may seem a somewhat extempore policy. But short of
some radical transformation of the situation, e.g. an all-
out effort by the Chinese to make our position intolerable
or an expressed determination by them to take over the
Colony in the fairly near future, it should see us through
the next ten years which is perhaps as far as Ministers
can reasonably be expected to look ahead. And in the
meantime Hong Kong should with luck earn its keep and
thus not place additional strain on our hard-pressed
resources.
para 4 will be
Your
nacful boois useful
for
the
80
Somment upon which we
recises this form
Чиму.
Janns Unmay.
(James Murray)
17 November, 1969.
I find myself in full apeement
TOP SECRET AND PERSONAL with you. However I believe Had
3
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Ministers and be presented with the hypothetical questions
Ion't
answer them!
even if they
Mw.17/xi
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