TNAG-0124-FCO40-160-Future-of-Hong-Kong-1969 — Page 15

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6.

It is suggested, therefore that our

forward planning for Hong Kong should cover the

contingency that a moment might come, even within

the next ten years, when either the Chinese

Government might make clear that they were willing

to talk seriously about the future of Hong Kong

or that H.M.G., seeing a more reasonable Govern-

ment in China, might think it wise to open talks.

If, in whichever of these two ways, talks were to

come about there are likely to be two principal

issues to be faced.

(a)

Are H.M.G. prepared to remain a

Colonial power up to 1997 - and,

and, if

the Chinese should want it, into the

twenty-first century?

(b) As the price for extending the lease

(and thus enabling H.M.G. to avoid

having to hand over the largely

unwilling inhabitants of Hong Kong

to Communism) would H.M.G. be willing

either to see rent paid for the New

Territories alone, or to retrocede

Hong Kong island and that part of

Kowloon to which they have title and

then to pay rent for the New Territories

and for a lease of the retroceded

Territories if this were also demanded?

If favourable answers in principle could be given

to these questions, there would seem to be

advantage in proceeding to a negotiation as soon

as the situation in China seemed right.

7. If, however, as is on the whole more

probable, the Chinese prove utterly intractable,

then the unpleasant situations envisaged in

K(69)1 seem likely to come about and H.M.G. will

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