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would resist for a brief period and then withdraw before greatly superior forces. In short we would surrender Hong
Kong with only an initial short period of determined
resistance.
85. If as a result of unremitting Chinese pressure on Hong Kong (short of a military take-over) we were forced to the point that our position was untenable and that our administration could not survive without conceding a measure of influence and control to China, cur conclusion is that we would have to take a unilateral decision to withdraw with all its attendant difficulties. The timing of such a decision would be very difficult. If the situation had reached that point, we would have to accept that the process of withdrawal would not be easy since it would greatly depend on Chinese goodwill, and this would almost certainly not be forthcoming. If the situation had not quite reached that point but was imminent, it would be politically very difficult to take a decision to withdraw.
86. In both cases we would seek to achieve some measure of evacuation of those to whom we have a special responsibility, particularly of vulnerable elements of the population (as outlined in OPD (67)85 already approved by Ministers).
87. But whether we seek to surrender the Colony in the face of military attack or seek to abdicate our position by a unilateral decision to withdraw, the fact remains that the Chinese may not accept or recognise our renunciation of
control. They could pursue the tactic of neither throwing us out nor allowing us to go; they could make no attempt to take over the administration of the Colony. Their object would be to retain a puppet British administration under firm
control.
88.
We reserve judgment as to whether in these circumstances
the Governor should be under instructions to refuse all
co-operation. Much must depend on what prospects there may be at the time for negotiating some accommodation that would help to ameliorate the fate of those who were locked in the Colony. For example there might be a case for co-operating temporarily with the Chinese if we thought that we held certain strong cards such as the continuance of trading relations with the Western world (paragraph 77). We could
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/of course
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